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I. INTRODUCTION
As a young professor at St. Mary’s University School of Law in the 1980s
I had the opportunity to teach in our summer program in Innsbruck,
Austria.1 At the time, faculty members were required to teach an
international or comparative law course, and I developed a mini-course in
population law and policy. Over the last thirty years, I have had the
opportunity to rethink and redevelop the course, and to teach it during
fifteen summers in the beautiful Austrian Alps. Our summer program
became known as the St. Mary’s Institute on World Legal Problems, and my
course developed into a human rights course with an emphasis on
population law and policy.
My course changed, as did international law and its emphasis on national
and world population concerns. This article is a reflection on those changes.
II. POPULATION BACKGROUND
Today, the population of the world is approximately seven and a half
billion people.2 This is fewer than some direly predicted in the

1. See Innsbruck, Austria Summer Study Abroad Program, ST. MARY’S U. SCH. L., https://law.
stmarytx.edu/academics/special-programs/austria/ [https://perma.cc/B87N-24NE], for information
regarding the current St. Mary’s Innsbruck Program.
2. POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, 2018 WORLD POPULATION DATA SHEET (2018),
https://www.prb.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2018_WPDS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9XTPLBAH] [hereinafter 2018 WORLD POPULATION DATA SHEET]. Most of the population data provided
within this article comes from the Population Resource Bureau (PRB), particularly the annual data
sheets. The PRB is a nonprofit, non-advocacy group that collects information, both in the United
States and internationally, about population and related issues of migration, environment, health, and
demographics. About, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, https://www.prb.org/about/ [https://
perma.cc/ME4M-78CP].
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1970s,3 but the world population is still growing at a pace of over one
hundred million persons per year.4 Population growth is affected by a host
of factors, including development, food supply, urbanization, birth rates,
contraceptive availability, life expectancy, health care, infant mortality, etc.5
How we got to a population of this size is primarily a function of the
development of new medical, agricultural, and manufacturing technologies.6
A. History
For most of our known history, the population growth rate was zero.7
Humans died from exposure, disease, and starvation. The average life
expectancy was low: twenty-five years for most of human history.8 Children
were vulnerable, and infant mortality was high. Humans lived as nomads,
hunting and gathering, moving as a tribe when needed.
About ten thousand years ago, the Agricultural Revolution occurred, and
humans discovered farming as well as the ability to domesticate and herd
animals.9 The world population started to grow from approximately five
3. See, e.g., PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB 17–27 (1968) (predicting the impending
and devastating effects of exponential population growth). The book—a best seller—was originally
published in 1968, predicting doom and destruction worldwide by the 1980s as a result of an
overpopulated Earth. Ehrlich predicted that starvation would destroy mankind since the ability to
produce food to feed all of mankind would not keep up with the population growth. Id. at xi (“The
battle to feed all of humanity is over. In the 1970s the world will undergo famines—hundreds of
millions of people are going to starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked upon now.”).
4. See, e.g., WORLDOMETERS, http://www.worldometers.info/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (acting
as a population “counter” that purportedly keeps track of all births and deaths worldwide).
5. See International Data, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, https://www.prb.org/
international/ [https://perma.cc/494X-ZWM3] (providing population data based on a list of
international data including life expectancy, urbanization, infant mortality rate, and other population
“indicators”).
6. See PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION EXPLOSION 55 (1990)
(contextualizing the “population explosion” with development of farming, medical, and industrial
technology).
7. See id. at 47–48 (“The growth rate of early human beings must have been very, very close to
zero over millions of years; otherwise, there would have been a prehistoric population explosion
equivalent to today’s.”); see also Diana D.M. Babor, Population Growth and Reproductive Rights in International
Human Rights Law, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 83, 85 (1999) (“In 10,000 B.C., life expectancy was twenty
years and, with the birth rate only 0.008% higher than the death rate, the potential for extinction was
always present.”).
8. See Babor, supra note 7, at 85–88 (exploring the history of population growth and life
expectancy trends).
9. See JOEL E. COHEN, HOW MANY PEOPLE CAN THE EARTH SUPPORT? 34 (1995) (“People
began to practice agriculture roughly 10,000 to 12,000 years ago . . . .”). But see EHRLICH & EHRLICH,
supra note 6, at 51 (“Exactly when people began to control herd of herbivorous animals in order to
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million to two or three hundred million by year 0 C.E./A.D.10 Lifespan
increased and infant mortality decreased. Humans were less likely to starve
to death, and one farmer could feed more than one family, making other
occupations possible. Metals could be worked into tools, while cooking and
food storage improved. However, disease still limited life expectancy and
population growth—the primary example being the Black Plague of the
Middle Ages.11 Between 1650 and 1800, the world population grew to
approximately one billion.12 The increase was partially due to better
understanding of medicine and increased capacity for cultivation. In
addition, trade increased, and new crops—suitable for different climates—
were exchanged. This generated some economic advances, which in turn
allowed the population to continue to grow. Infant mortality again
decreased, and life expectancy started to lengthen.13
By 1900, the Industrial Revolution was underway bringing change
to the developed world.14 Death rates decreased dramatically due to
improved understanding of hygiene and the development of modern
medicine. Life expectancy grew to approximately fifty years.15 Cities
drew workers for the factories and modern farming techniques made it
possible to feed more people with fewer farmers. Thereafter, the Green
Revolution of the 1960s in farming made it possible to feed people
worldwide, leading to a decrease in death rates—even in undeveloped

maintain access to steady supplies of meat, and perhaps to facilitate the animals’ reproduction, isn’t
known.”).
10. See Babor, supra note 7, at 85–86 (“In 0 A.D., the world’s population had grown to 250
million due to improved mortality and the population doubling time was reduced to about 1900
years.”).
11. See Robert C. Cook, World Population Prospects, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 634, 636 (1966) (“[T]he Black
Plague entered Europe through Italy bringing with it a horror which shocked even a civilization
accustomed to suffering . . . . Still, world population growth continued . . . .”).
12. See EHRLICH & EHRLICH, supra note 6, at 55 (“By sometime around 1800, the world
population had grown to a billion.”); see also COHEN, supra note 9, at 42 (“Between 1650 and 1850, the
human population more than doubled as its surging growth rate reached levels that were then
unprecedented.”).
13. See EHRLICH & EHRLICH, supra note 6, at 55 (“[The changes that occurred around 1800]
led to declines in death rates, especially among infants and small children.”).
14. See EDGAR R. CHASTEEN, THE CASE FOR COMPULSORY BIRTH CONTROL 25 (1971)
(“Whereas the Agricultural Revolution had freed man from the arbitrary whims of nature, the Industrial
Revolution harnessed the forces of nature. Suddenly man no longer worked and lived in direct contact
with nature.”).
15. See COHEN, supra note 9, at 49 (“By 1900, life expectancy at birth was [forty] to [fifty] years
in North America and most of northwestern Europe.”).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol50/iss3/5

4

Mather: Population Law and Policy

2019]

POPULATION LAW AND POLICY

921

countries.16 Soon after, the population reached three and a half billion and
continued to grow to the over seven billion people of today.17
B. Theories of Population Growth
Ancient philosophers—including the Chinese, the Greeks, and the
Romans—all had theories about optimum population size.18 For example,
the Romans were interested in the greatest population size possible to
facilitate military operations. Later, the developing world encouraged
population growth in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to provide
workers, soldiers, and settlers for new colonies.19 However, the emphasis
was on the good of the state, rather than on the individual, and the poor
eventually came to be seen as a drain on state resources.20
Enter Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus, an English minister.21 He was
disturbed about the status of the poor, and published pamphlets advocating
the withdrawal of “poor laws” designed to provide relief to the poor and
the abolition of charity to those in need.22 Malthus believed that the poor
should die a “natural” death, leaving only those who were strong enough,
physically and mentally, to support themselves. He believed that population
would increase exponentially, doubling every several years, and the food
supply and the standard of living of the world population would only

16. See CHASTEEN, supra note 14, at 68 (suggesting the U.S. government believed strongly in
the Green Revolution as a remedy to food shortage).
17. 2018 WORLD POPULATION DATA SHEET, supra note 2.
18. See CHASTEEN, supra note 14, at 53–65 (examining the range of population theories offered
by ancient philosophers); see also BENJAMIN VIEL, THE DEMOGRAPHIC EXPLOSION: THE LATIN
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 68–78 (James Walls trans., 1976) (reviewing various theories and predictions
of population growth by thinkers such as Malthus, Verhultz, and Pearl).
19. See CHASTEEN, supra note 14, at 55–56 (“[T]he prevailing economic doctrine of Western
Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries . . . depended upon its having a large
population to work its land, settle its colonies, fight its wars[,] and feed the labor force consumed by
its fledgling industries.”).
20. See id. at 56 (analyzing the mercantilist understanding of an inverse relationship between the
interest in the individual and the state).
21. Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus was born in 1766 and died in 1834. See VIEL, supra
note 18, at 71 (“[T]he Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus earns the credit for having been the first to
analyze [the phenomenon of population growth rate exceeding resources] in depth.”).
22. Malthus’s essay on population was published in the Encyclopedia Britannica in 1824, gaining
him great fame or great notoriety, depending on the reader. See id. (“[Malthus’s] first essay, dated 1789,
gained him sufficient reputation so that later, in 1824, the Encyclopedia Britannica published his famous
essay on ‘Population’ which, as happens with so many famous works, very few have read in the
original.”).
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increase arithmetically—in a straight upward slope.23 Overall, Malthus
believed that the world was headed towards worldwide famine and wars
over the insufficient food supply.
While the catastrophic future predicted by Malthus never materialized, he
was quite influential and is still noted today in many modern writings with
both admiration and criticism.24 However, Malthus failed to see the
possibility of increased food productivity and the eventual widespread
availability of birth control, as well as the Industrial Revolution of the next
century.25
The most influential population growth theory in modern times is the
demographic transition theory.26 This was widely accepted in the 1950s and
1960s, mainly because it reflected the experience of the developed Western
World.27 In general, the theory suggests that population moves in four
stages:
Stage one begins in pre-industrial societies, where both birth and death rates
are high, keeping the population stable. After a country achieves improved
living conditions, the country moves into the second stage where death rates
begin to fall, but birth rates remain high because families still require a large
number of children for farm labor and old-age security for parents. . . .
[In stage three,] [a]s living conditions continue to improve, urbanization
occurs, the status of women improves and the cost-benefit analysis for child
23. Id. (“Malthusuan theory . . . basically states that human populations increase at a geometric
rate while their food supplies increase arithmetically . . . .”). In addition, Malthus also advocated for
late marriage and abstinence from sexual relations prior to marriage to reduce birth rates.
24. See id. at 73 (discussing the controversial nature of Malthus’s theory, but finding his writings
to contain “a solid truth”); see also CHASTEEN, supra note 14, at 58 (“A good case could be made for
considering Malthus’ first Essay on the Principles of Population . . . as one of the half dozen or so most
important books ever written.”).
25. See CHASTEEN, supra note 14, at 58–59 (“Malthus made two serious mistakes. First he failed
to foresee the widespread use of contraceptives in the Western [W]orld . . . . Malthus also failed to see
the greatly increasing productivity of the land.”).
26. See, e.g., Reed Boland, The Environment, Population, and Women’s Human Rights, 27 ENVTL. L.
1137, 1163 (1997) (“Although demographers have differed on the details of [demographic transition]
theory, most have concluded that, in general terms, it does account for demographic developments
observed in industrialized countries.”); see also COHEN, supra note 9, at 46–47 (“Demographers organize
much of their thinking about population growth during the last two centuries and the coming decades
in terms of, or in opposition to, a concept called ‘the demographic transition.’”).
27. See Boland, supra note 26, at 1162 (“Most discussions of the causes of fertility decline begin
with reference to the theory of ‘demographic transition,’ which gained prominence after the Second
World War to explain the stabilization of population in industrialized countries between the
[nineteenth] and [twentieth] centuries.”).
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bearing shifts in favor of smaller families. Parents do not need large families
for farm work and old-age security, but instead must educate their children,
which increases the cost of raising a large family. . . .
As a country moves from stage three into stage four, birth and death rates
again reach parity, and population stabilizes.28

Taking this into consideration, the four stages can be summarized as
follows: 1) pre-industrial; 2) developing; 3) urbanization; and 4) stabilization.
The demographic transition occurred in the developed Western World,
but the pattern was not been repeated in most still-developing countries.29
Population continued to grow in the so-called “Third World,” leading to
great concern by environmentalists and biologists in the 1970s and 1980s.30
Two competing schools of thought emerged during this time—an alarmist
view about the disastrous results of a burgeoning population, and a more
optimistic approach that welcomed the human resources a larger population
would bring to bear on all world problems.
Under the first view, the alarmists were variously known as
neo-Malthusians, the Apocalyptics, or “Econuts.”31 Most of these
individuals were focused on the impact of the world’s burgeoning
population on biology and ecology.32 Their concerns were somewhat
reminiscent of Malthus in that they believed that the Earth had a limited
carrying capacity for humans. According to the alarmist view, a large
28. Jill M. Bracken, Comment, Respecting Human Rights in Population Policies: An International
Customary Right to Reproductive Choice, 6 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 197, 199–200 (1995).
29. See id. (outlining the four stages of demographic transition theory and concluding “[m]ost
of the countries in Western Europe and North America have completed this transition”); COHEN,
supra note 9, at 47 (limiting the demographic transition pattern to “developed” countries).
30. See, e.g., EDITH EFRON, THE APOCALYPTICS: HOW ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS
CONTROLS WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CANCER 33 (1984) (introducing the dire population predictions
by ecologists and biologists like Paul Ehrlich and Rachel Carson); see also John W. Ratcliffe, The Reagan
Population Policy: An Error of the Third Kind, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 267, 270 (1987) (“Uncontrolled
population growth in the Third World is seen as the underlying cause of the hunger, poverty, illiteracy,
and poor health which characterize underdevelopment.”).
31. See EFRON, supra note 30, at 31 (“The first apocalyptic of national importance was Rachel
Carson . . . .”); GARRETT HARDIN, STALKING THE WILD TABOO 262 (3d ed., 1996) (describing the
group of people “deeply concerned about population and the environment” as “Econuts”); Steven
Bader, The Perceived Conflict Between Human Rights and Environmental Protection: How Organized Religion Can
Reconcile the Viewpoints and Promote Sustainable Consumption, 13 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 3, 3 (2009–2010)
(analyzing the common ground religious perspectives can provide between conflicting population
theories such as Neo-Malthusians and Anti-Malthusians).
32. See, e.g., EFRON, supra note 30, at 31 (“[The perspective of] Rachel Carson, a biologist who
worked at the Fish and Wildlife Service . . . was that formed by ecology.”).
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population posed irreversible threats to the environment and the quality of
human life. Further, they believed that a large population would lead to the
depletion of natural resources and reduced biodiversity. Another concern
shared by this group was the belief that individuals would not voluntarily
reduce the number of children they have, requiring some sort of
government coercion or influence.33
The alarmist view is well-represented by biologist Paul Ehrlich in his book
The Population Bomb34 and a later book, written with his wife Anne, The
Population Explosion.35 Garrett Hardin, another biologist, wrote the
well-known essay The Tragedy of the Commons.36 Both authors argue that
self-interest will not lead individuals to reduce the number of children they
have, concluding that additional measures are needed.37 While neither
Ehrlich nor Hardin advocate for the harsh measures eventually employed
by China and India, both argue that some sort of agreed upon coercion is
both necessary and acceptable.38 For them, the focus is on the control of
the population.
The second, and more optimistic, view was propounded largely by
economists—most notably Julian Simon.39 In general, Simon and others
33. See id. at 34 (“[Paul Ehrlich] compared the growth of population to cancer and demanded
surgery . . . . Government, he said, had to be the surgeon.”).
34. EHRLICH, supra note 3, at xi (“At this late date nothing can prevent a substantial increase in
the world death rate, although many lives could be saved through dramatic programs to ‘stretch’ the
carrying capacity of the [E]arth by increasing food production. But these programs will only provide
a stay of execution unless they are accompanied by determined and successful efforts at population
control.”).
35. EHRLICH & EHRLICH, supra note 6, at 57 (“Human beings now occupy and use, at one level
or another, some two thirds of the planet’s land surface, and are striving to find ways to exploit the
remaining inhospitable third.”).
36. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
37. See id. at 1245 (exploring the legislative options to require temperance); see also EFRON, supra
note 30, at 34 (“Ehrlich called for the creation of a ‘powerful government agency’ which would research
and impose such solutions as ‘compulsory birth regulation,’ ‘the addition of temporary sterilants to
water supplies or staple food,’ ‘financial rewards and penalties designed to discourage
reproduction . . . .”).
38. See EHRLICH & EHRLICH, supra note 6, at 58 (viewing the impact of human population as
an issue of destruction “on the environmental systems that sustain us”).
39. Simon was a professor of economics and business as well as the author of several books
and articles in the area of population. See JULIAN L. SIMON, POPULATION MATTERS: PEOPLE,
RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT, AND IMMIGRATION 21–22 (1990) (devoting a chapter to explain that
life is getting better); JULIAN L. SIMON, THE RESOURCEFUL EARTH: A RESPONSE TO GLOBAL 2000
57–63 (Julian L. Simon & Herman Kahn eds., 1984) (offering an optimistic view of population growth
as subsistence continues to ease); JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE 3–4 (1981)
[hereinafter SIMON, ULTIMATE RESOURCE] (providing an introduction to Simon’s population and
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believed that more people would result in more human resources being
devoted to solving human problems. More people meant more human
minds at work, using their skills to solve problems—whether
environmental, technical, or population-related. Another aspect of this
argument, referred to as supply-side demographics, theorizes that a large
population creates a greater demand for goods and services, which expands
markets, leading to economic growth and greater general prosperity.40
Relatedly, they expressed concern, borne out in fact, that reducing
population growth leads to an aging population, resulting in workforce
shortages and creating support issues for the elderly. For example, a very
low population growth rate in Japan has resulted in these problems.41
Finally, some were concerned about the slowing population growth in the
developed parts of the world, with the corresponding decrease in white,
educated, Christian, and Jewish populations.42
In the last three decades, I saw an increased emphasis on the human rights
aspects of population issues. This increase is due in no small part to the
draconian “one-child” policy adopted by China during the 1980s, and the
techniques used to enforce it;43 India’s emphasis on sterilization to control
growth;44 and the population growth policies imposed in Romania by the

resource problems); see also JACQUELINE KASUN, THE WAR AGAINST POPULATION: THE
ECONOMICS AND IDEOLOGY OF THE WORLD POPULATION CONTROL 22 (1988) (arguing the
“population scare” was spurred by misunderstood and misinterpreted economics).
40. See SIMON, ULTIMATE RESOURCE, supra note 39, at 4 (“The child or immigrant will pay
taxes later on, contribute energy and resources to the community, produce goods and services for the
consumption of others, and make efforts to beautify and purify the environment.”).
41. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Carmen Brun, Protecting Families in a Global Economy, 13 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 203–04 (2006) (“Japanese policy is designed to increase birth rates and
address the economic problems associated with the rapidly aging population.”).
42. See MICHAEL S. TEITELBAUM & JAY M. WINTER, THE FEAR OF POPULATION DECLINE
4–8 (1985) (discussing the demography of population decline); BEN J. WATTENBERG, THE BIRTH
DEARTH 112–13, 116–18 (1987) (analyzing the population demographics based on U.S. fertility rates,
and noting a decrease in birth rates among citizens of Western European heritage).
43. See David M. Smolin, The Missing Girls of China: Population, Policy, Culture, Gender, Abortion,
Abandonment, and Adoption in East-Asian Perspective, 41 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 5–7 (2010) (attributing the sex
ratio imbalance in China to the country’s “population control policies”—including the “one-child
policy”—and discussing how the policies were enforced); Amy Hampton, Comment, Population Control
in China: Sacrificing Human Rights for the Greater Good?, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 321, 330–31 (2003)
(explaining how China’s “one-child policy” was enforced).
44. Dipika Jain & Natassia M. Rozario, Between Cairo and Haryana: How Far Have Reproductive
Rights Come After Twenty Years of ICPD?, 35 WHITTIER L. REV. 373, 379–80 (2014) (recognizing India
as “the first country in the world to make family[-]planning part of its official policy” but describing
the transition of the program to “relying heavily on sterilization”).
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dictator Nicolae Ceausescu during part of the same period.45
C. World Conferences on Population
The theories and goals discussed in the previous section are reflected in
the United Nations Conferences on Population, as well as various
conferences on environmental issues and the status of women.46 The three
world population conferences—Bucharest in 1974, Mexico City in 1984,
and Cairo in 1994—in addition to the two other population conferences—
Rome in 1954 and Belgrade in 1965—focused largely on contraception and
providing contraceptive access to “individuals” or “couples.”47 In these
early days, the belief was that if couples had access to contraception and the
demographic transition was in process, then the population would
stabilize.48 By 1974, world leaders and environmentalists were alarmed at
the rate of population growth worldwide and concerned about the
environmental impact of the population reaching five billion.49 The 1974
World Population Conference in Bucharest, Romania—the first
intergovernmental world conference on population—resulted in a World
Population Plan of Action seeking to protect the rights of couples and
individuals to access and use contraception, while also focusing on the impact
of population growth on the environment, the over consumption of world
resources, and the effect of large populations on society as a whole.50 Thus,
45. See Karen Breslau, Overplanned Parenthood: Ceausescu’s Cruel Law, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1990,
at 35, http://www.skeptictank.org/hs/preg.htm [https://perma.cc/8RRS-QFXE] (describing the
policies Ceausescu implemented to increase the population of Romania).
46. See Babor, supra note 7, at 89–91, for general information on the conferences and the
progression of thought. The inception of the United Nations was October 24, 1945. United Nations
Conferences on Population, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, https://www.un.org/
en/development/desa/population/events/conference/index.asp [https://perma.cc/EBU6-E9RH]
[hereinafter United Nations Conferences on Population]. Since then, “three world conferences on population
have been held[,]” while “[t]wo other conferences on population have been convened.” Id.; see also
Bracken, supra note 28, at 197 (“[A] human right to reproductive choice exists under international
customary law.”).
47. Babor, supra note 7, at 89, 100–01; United Nations Conferences on Population, supra note 46.
48. See Babor, supra note 7, at 88–89 (“Lowering the birthrate and improving social welfare in
pursuit of economic growth had given rise to population policies generally characterized by
demographic targets, contraceptive acceptors and the subordination of human rights to an antinatalist
(and more rarely, pronatalist) control over fertility.”).
49. See Paula Abrams, Population Control and Sustainability: It’s the Same Old Song but with a Different
Meaning, 27 ENVTL. L. 1111, 1112–13, 1117 (1997) (discussing the “Bucharest World Population
Conference [of] 1974” and the growing concerns of overpopulation and the potential environmental
impacts).
50. Babor, supra note 7, at 89–90, 101; United Nations Conferences on Population, supra note 46.
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the developed world’s consumption of resources was scrutinized, along with
the loss of culture, environmental harm, and pollution that results from
rapid development.51
In 1981, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was entered into force.52
The Convention covers areas such as suffrage, education, opportunity, and
legal equality for women. CEDAW also contains the classic human rights
formula regarding individual procreation decisions: “The same rights to
decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children
and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them
to exercise these rights[.]”53
By 1984, the economics-focused supply-side demographics won some
advocates, including the U.S. government. At the International Conference
on Population in Mexico City, the Reagan Administration announced a new
policy.54 The “Mexico City Policy” prohibited the United States from
providing financial support to non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
that provided abortion services, abortion counseling services, education
about abortion, or were engaged in lobbying for less restrictive abortion
laws.55 The Administration took “the position that population growth was
a ‘neutral phenomenon’” and that more people might lead to more benefits
in the world.56 In 1993, the Mexico City Policy was rescinded by the

51. See Babor, supra note 7, at 89–90 (“That ‘development would be the best contraceptive’
became the prevailing aphorism, even though, as it is now realized, a rapid change in overall conditions
can also eradicate culture, undermine the potential for an ecologically-balanced environment and
generally result in increased pollution.”).
52. United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter
CEDAW]; see also Abrams, supra note 49, at 1128–29 (“The Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is the most significant international treaty
protecting the rights of women in matters of fertility and sexuality.”).
53. CEDAW, supra note 52, at 20.
54. Ratcliffe, supra note 30, at 294; see also Allegra A. Jones, Note, The “Mexico City Policy” and Its
Effects on HIV/AIDS Services in Sub-Saharan Africa, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 187, 189 (2004)
(“Officially called the ‘Mexico City Policy,’ this condition on foreign assistance was first announced by
Reagan [A]dministration officials at the United Nations (UN) International Conference on Population
in Mexico City in 1984.”).
55. See Jones, supra note 54, at 194 (“[The Mexico City Policy] prohibited organizations receiving
U.S. funds from using their own money to perform abortions, to lobby foreign governments for
abortion legalization, or to conduct public education campaigns regarding the benefits or availability
of abortion.”).
56. Babor, supra note 7, at 90.
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Clinton Administration; however, the policy was reinstated in 2001 by the
Bush Administration and continues to serve as a political football today.57
In 1992, the United Nations held an Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, which was intended to focus on protecting the environment.58 The
watchword of this conference was sustainability—how to balance the need
for a healthy environment with the need for individual freedoms in family
decision making.59 However, population concerns emerged as the primary
issue of the Earth Summit.
In 1994, world population policy saw a dramatic change. The
International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, Egypt,
moved from an emphasis on economic development to a focus on gender
equality for women.60 Besides contraception, the importance of education
for women was emphasized as one of the essential elements needed for
population stabilization or reduction.61 In 1995, the Beijing World
Conference on Women continued the focus on education of women, gender
equality, and promotion of sexual health. This conference was steered
largely by NGOs, rather than nation states.62 The shift to NGOs

57. See Jones, supra note 54, at 192–95 (providing an overview of the history of the Mexico City
Policy).
58. See generally Al Gore, Address at Rio Earth Summit, 59 TENN. L. REV. 645 (1992) (addressing
the motivations and goals of the Rio Earth Summit).
59. See id. at 646 (“We must listen when those who best understand the population problem tell
us that it is linked not merely to the availability of safe and effective birth control on a voluntary basis,
but it is also profoundly linked to poverty, injustice, human suffering, and child mortality.”); Abrams,
supra note 49, at 1112 (“Overpopulation is a multi-faceted problem . . . [l]ike most complex social
problems, development of successful strategies to address the population problem requires
consideration of conflicting values and priorities.”); Roger Martella & Kim Smaczniak, Introduction to
Rio +20: A Reflection on Progress Since the First Earth Summit and the Opportunities That Lie Ahead,
12 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 4, 6 (2012) (“The pertinent question for Rio+20 thus becomes how
to recognize and account for the achievement gap to streamline implementation in the future, in
addition to what role this particular conference can play in reinforcing commitment or amplifying the
effectiveness of ongoing efforts to advance sustainable development.”).
60. Babor, supra note 7, at 92–98; United Nations Conferences on Population, supra note 46.
61. Babor, supra note 7, at 93.
62. See, e.g., Athena D. Mutua, Five Years After Beijing: A Report Card on Women’s Human Rights,
94 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 287, 287 (2000) (discussing the Beijing Conference and the subsequent
barriers to implementation five years after the conference); see also Charlotte Bunch, Looking Back,
Looking Forward: Women’s Human Rights in Global Perspective, 38 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 333, 334 (2017)
(“Feminists in particular crossed these lines and worked together to bring women’s perspectives out
of the shadows of ‘special interests’ and onto the world agenda.”); Elizabeth L. Larson, Comment,
United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development, and Peace (Beijing, China:
September 1995), 10 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 695, 696 (1996) (acknowledging the successes and
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demonstrates a change in focus from national to special interests. However,
this is criticized by some authors who argue that NGOs represent their
special interests in terms of human rights but may actually have goals that
are political or social in nature.63 Such goals might be interpreted as
interference with traditional notions of family structure, including parental
control over children and adolescents. In 2012, the London Summit on
Family Planning found that simple access to birth control was still a problem
for 222 million people, resulting in eighty million unplanned pregnancies
and forty million abortions.64
III. NATIONAL OR CULTURAL ACTIONS AFFECTING POPULATION
A. China
China is noted for its aggressive population control policies, particularly
during the 1980s and 1990s.65 When Mao Zedong came to power in 1949,
he believed that population control was a “capitalist myth” and that China’s
population should be as large as possible.66 In this view, the advantages of
advancements of the Beijing conference in terms of women’s rights, and critiquing the implementation
of the Conference to global governments).
63. See, e.g., Maria Sophia Aguirre & Ann Wolfgram, United Nations Policy and the Family: Redefining
the Ties That Bind: A Study of History, Forces and Trends, 16 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 113, 119 (2002) (“The
changing definition of family in [United Nations] documents has been significantly influenced by nonstate actors interacting through transnational advocacy networks, with each other, with states, and with
international organizations.”).
64. Jain & Rozario, supra note 44, at 377–78.
65. Much has been written on the subject of Chinese population policy. See Smolin, supra note
43, at 2 (“China’s sex-ratio imbalance is ‘often seen as an unintended consequence’ of
China’s . . . extraordinary state control of procreation.”); Jennie A. Clarke, Comment, The Chinese
Population Policy: A Necessary Evil?, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 321, 322 (1987) (“China’s population
control policy is one of the first and most stringent of its kind. . . . By Western standards, the policy is
intolerably intrusive into matters of family, privacy and individual choice.” (footnote omitted));
Hampton, supra note 43, at 323 (critiquing the enforcement of China’s population control and
providing a broad overview of the development and origins of that harsh policy); Lee Shlamowitz,
Comment, The Sun and the Scythe: Combining Climate and Population Policy to Solve the Greatest Challenges the
World Has Ever Faced, 24 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 247, 257–65 (2010) (reviewing China’s
extraordinary stance on population control and the potential infringement on civil liberties); see generally
Barbara Stark, Crazy Jane Talks with the Bishop: Abortion in China, Germany, South Africa and International
Human Rights Law, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 287, 295 (2003) (“Draconian population control measures
were viewed as necessary to counter traditional preferences for large families. . . . [The] policy was
enforced through a broad range of methods, including onerous fines on excess children, forced
sterilizations[,] and abortions . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
66. See Clarke, supra note 65, at 327–28 (describing China’s population policies implemented
under Mao Zedong); Hampton, supra note 43, at 323 (“Mao Zedong believed a person’s amount of
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a large national population included laborers, soldiers, and possible
survivors of a nuclear war. The policies were very successful, and the
population boomed through the 1960s and early 1970s.67 However, by the
early 1970s, the need to slow population growth became clear: “The
[g]overnment encouraged late marriage, postponement of child-bearing,
families of one or two children, and spacing of four to five years between
children.”68 The government instituted economic sanctions and incentives
by 1978. Families with only one or two children—or those who signed a
one-child pledge—were rewarded with salary bonuses, education benefits,
housing privileges, and other benefits.69 This policy worked well in cities,
but not in rural areas where children were still an economic asset in an oldfashioned agricultural economy.70
In 1980, China instituted its infamous “one-child” policy.71 The policy
required that couples have only one child. Penalties were imposed for
having a second child.72 The government offered economic, health,
education, and environmental rationales for the policy.73 In rural areas,
compliance was limited, and coercion of abortions and sterilizations was
believed prevalent.74 In order to help with enforcement of the one-child
policy at the local level, China instituted what came to be known as “the
‘granny police,’ [consisting of] older women who [would] visit the women
in their neighborhoods on a regular basis in order to monitor and instruct
them in the use of contraceptives and to remind them to go for medical
checkups.”75 The Chinese government officially opposed coercion;
consumption could be less than his level of production and actually encouraged population growth by
providing incentives for government workers to increase their family size.”).
67. Hampton, supra note 43, at 323.
68. Clarke, supra note 65, at 329.
69. E.g., Hampton, supra note 43, at 333 (“Couples who keep their family size to one child may
receive the following benefits: monetary payment, medical and educational benefits, preferential
treatment for employment, and even land allocation.”).
70. See Smolin, supra note 43, at 17–18 (describing the variation in enforcement of China’s
population control policies); Clarke, supra note 65, at 341 (“The one-child policy causes economic
hardship for rural dwellers since they must forego the potential increment in productivity of additional
children.”).
71. Stark, supra note 65.
72. Clarke, supra note 65, at 331.
73. See id. at 332–33 (explaining China’s various “justifications for imposing the one-child
policy”).
74. See id. at 340 (“Chinese officials believe[d] that a more stringent population policy [would]
overcome rural resistance and counter the substantial negative impact that rural non-compliance ha[d]
on the overall results of the policy.”).
75. Id. at 346.
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however, it has been suggested that lower-level officials might have taken
extreme measures (i.e., forced or coerced sterilizations and abortions) in
order to meet the population goals set by higher officials.76
One of the most troubling aspects of the Chinese one-child policy was
the prevalence of female infanticide.77 In traditional Chinese society, males
are valued more than females, and women who gave birth to first-born
daughters were often abused by their families.78 As a result, couples who
received a prenatal screen revealing the sex of their unborn children elected
to abort female fetuses. This practice of prenatal sex screening was later
outlawed.79 In rural communities, couples might choose to abandon female
infants or possibly kill them.80 By 2000, the ratio of males to females in
China was out of balance. The normal ratio of male to female births is 105
to 100, but in China the ratio was 117 to 100.81 China eventually relaxed
some of the rules for certain couples: if two only-children married, they were
permitted to have two children, certain ethnic minorities were allowed to
have more than one child, etc.82
It is possible the one-child policy will lead to political and social problems
in the future in China, most notably the shortage of marriageable females
may create problematic sexual dynamics—women being selective, and
choosing more wealthy and educated men in the cities rather than in the
rural areas.83 Historically, Chinese culture places relationship power in the
man. Rural communities may die out in situations where available
marriageable women leave, and the men either follow them or die without
descendants. In addition, crime rates and military conflicts may increase due
to the overly large male population. Finally, the Chinese rely on adult
children to care for elderly parents, and the lack of younger family members

76. Id. at 347.
77. See id. at 349–51 (attributing “widespread cases of female infanticide and abuse” to China’s
population policy).
78. See id. at 342–45 (describing traditional beliefs in Chinese culture); Hampton, supra note 43,
at 324 (“A preference for male children has endured throughout Chinese history.”).
79. Clarke, supra note 65, at 350–51.
80. See Hampton, supra note 43, at 326 (“The preference by couples to produce male offspring
has thus created the likelihood for more occurrences of female infanticide and abandonment of girl
babies.”).
81. Id. at 346.
82. See Smolin, supra note 43, at 16–17 (discussing “various exceptions to the one-child norm”).
83. See Hampton, supra note 43, at 347 (“With the steady increase of the male population and
the decline of the female population, men will find it increasingly difficult to marry.”).
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to care for the elders may lead to problems in the future.84
B. India
In 1952, India established one of the first national level family-planning
programs.85 Initially, the focus was on the poor, but it eventually evolved
into a program with an emphasis on sterilization.86 In the late 1960s, India
created vasectomy camps. These were aimed at men and were organized as
rural festivals with cultural and political exhibits and programs, as well as
celebrity appearances and performances.87 Dancing, floats, and slogans
abounded, as men joined the celebration and became sterilized. Incentives
were provided, and as financial incentives increased, the number of
vasectomies increased.88 Tens of thousands of men were sterilized through
the family-planning festivals.89 However, the birth rate did not come
down.90 India’s already large population continued to grow.91
From 1975 to 1977, India began a strong-arm sterilization program.92
State and local level quotas were established, and state and local
governments were ordered to enforce them. Couples who were not
sterilized were denied food rations and government services, and couples
with more than three children were subject to fines or imprisonment.93
84. See, e.g., id. at 349–50 (explaining the potential future implications of China’s population
control policies).
85. Jain & Rozario, supra note 44, at 379.
86. See id. at 379–80 (describing the shift in India’s family-planning program); see also STEPHEN
L. ISAACS, Compulsory Sterilization for Demographic Reasons: The Example of India (“Compulsory sterilization
was never put into effect by the Indian government.”), in POPULATION LAW AND POLICY 193, 193
(Stephen L. Isaacs ed., 1981).
87. M.F. Franda, Mass Vasectomy Camps and Incentives in Indian Family Planning, 16 AM. U. FIELD
STAFF REP.: SOUTH ASIA SERIES, no. 7, June 1972, at 1–16, reprinted in POPULATION LAW AND
POLICY 316, 316–17 (Stephen L. Isaacs ed., 1981).
88. Id. at 317.
89. See id. at 317–18 (providing statistics regarding how many men were sterilized at various
camps).
90. BETSY HARTMANN, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND WRONGS: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF
POPULATION CONTROL AND CONTRACEPTIVE CHOICE 237 (1987).
91. See id. at 237–40 (asserting sterilization camps will not be the solution to India’s population
problem).
92. Id. at 237–38.
93. See id. (“Fines and imprisonment threatened couples who failed to be sterilized after three
children, and food rations and other government services were withheld from the unsterilized.”); Jain
& Rozario, supra note 44, at 382–83 (describing state level enforcement mechanisms aimed at curtailing
population growth); see also Luke T. Lee, Compulsory Sterilization and Human Rights, 3 POPULI, no. 4, 1976,
at 2 (“Violation of the law would entail an imprisonment of six months to two years or a fine . . . .”),
reprinted in POPULATION LAW AND POLICY 194, 194 (Stephen L. Isaacs ed., 1981).
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Forced sterilization impacted an estimated six and a half million people in
the last half of 1976.94 Perhaps the most interesting and surprising aspect
of the policy was the failure of the international community to condemn the
forced sterilizations.95 Some believed that the program was a necessary evil,
while some admired the strong leadership displayed by the Indian
government.
After 1977, the sterilization program continued without the mandatory
aspect, but coercion persisted.96 The focus shifted to birth control for
women—young poor women were incentivized to undergo sterilization,
while elite rural women were able to use inter-uterine devices (IUDs).97
Coercion also occurred in a more subtle way, with community leaders
pressuring women to be sterilized after one or two children. Financial
rewards were offered, which are arguably inherently coercive to the poorest
of populations.98
The Indian 2000 National Population Policy established goals for
universal access to birth control; information and counseling; access to
health care; education for girls; and delaying marriage until after the age of
twenty.99 Despite repeated efforts and revisions to various programs, the
population in India continues to rise and is likely to surpass the population
of China in a few years.100 India continues to struggle with the dual
challenge of reducing population growth and preserving human rights. The
persistent focus on sterilization is problematic, as is the use of camps in poor
and rural communities. Access to and information about birth control is
still lacking, and high maternal mortality coupled with young marriage
continues.101

94. HARTMANN, supra note 90, at 238.
95. E.g., id. (“Although the compulsory sterilization campaign received critical coverage in the
foreign press, many members of the population establishment were slow to condemn it.”).
96. See id. at 239–40 (describing the rise and fall of India’s sterilization program).
97. Id. at 238–39; Jain & Rozario, supra note 44, at 386–87.
98. See Babor, supra note 7, at 119 (“The perception that financial incentives have ‘more to do
with coercion than with choice’ in developing countries and that for the ‘desperately poor, there is no
such thing as free choice’ reflects concern that the impoverished will have their decision whether to
have more children foreclosed by the threat of monetary loss or the offer of monetary gain.”).
99. Jain & Rozario, supra note 44, at 381–82.
100. See 2018 WORLD POPULATION DATA SHEET, supra note 2, at 1 (predicting India to
become the most populous country by 2050).
101. See Jain & Rozario, supra note 44, at 382–85 (identifying improvements and lingering gaps
in India’s population policy).
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C. Romania
In 1966, Dictator Nicolae Ceausescu planned to drastically increase the
population of his country and declared the fetus as the property of the entire
society.102 He outlawed abortion, contraception, and sex education,
including all books on sexuality and reproduction.103 Women were
rounded up at work every few months and examined for signs of pregnancy.
If a child did not appear at the appropriate time, the woman might be
questioned and fined.104
The problem for the citizens of Romania was lack of nutrition and health
care, as well as a poor economy.105 Romanians smuggled in condoms and
birth control pills and sought illegal abortions; it was estimated that 60% of
all pregnancies ended in abortion or miscarriage during this time. Children
were abandoned by impoverished parents, and by 1988, “Romanian
orphanages were filled beyond capacity with children who had been
abandoned.”106 Ceausescu was overthrown in 1989, and his policies,
including the abortion ban, were rescinded.107
D. Indonesia
Often considered a success story, Indonesia was able to successfully
reduce its population growth rate during the 1970s and the 1980s,
particularly in the more highly populated areas of Java and Bali.108 In 1970,
the government established family-planning clinics, and communities were
organized into women’s Acceptor Clubs, led by wives of village or local

102. Breslau, supra note 45.
103. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 57 (1990) (“Perhaps
the best example of autocracy in abortion legislation has been Romania, which in 1966, in an attempt
to increase population, banned all abortions for ‘social reasons,’ as well as all contraception.”); Breslau,
supra note 45 (“[Ceausescu] forbade sex education. Books on human sexuality and reproduction were
classified as ‘state secrets,’ to be used only as medical textbooks.”).
104. Breslau, supra note 45.
105. See id. (“At first Romania’s birthrate nearly doubled. But poor nutrition and inadequate
prenatal care endangered many pregnant women.”).
106. TRIBE, supra note 103, at 58; see also Breslau, supra note 45 (noting “[u]nwanted survivors
often ended up in orphanages”).
107. See TRIBE, supra note 103, at 58 (“It is not surprising that one of the first acts of Romania’s
new government following the bloody Romanian revolution of late 1989 was the legalization of
abortion.”); Boland, supra note 26, at 1140–41 (“By the end of 1989, when the Ceausescu regime was
overthrown, it became clear that the Romanian population had been subjected to one of the most
highly restrictive pro-natalist population control policies ever devised.”).
108. HARTMANN, supra note 90, at 74.
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leaders, to establish relationships with the clinics.109 Women were steered
toward IUDs and birth control pills, since those are more reliable forms of
birth control than most barrier methods. Later, rural women were urged to
use IUDs, since they were more likely to stop use of pills due to lack of
supply or medical supervision.110
The Indonesian system was criticized for its focus on IUDs and birth
control pills as the options most strongly promoted to women.111
Indonesia also established “mass IUD ‘safaris,’” with a picnic or party-like
atmosphere, filled with exhortations, speeches, and small gifts for
acceptors.112 There was some concern that acceptors were coerced
through propaganda, paternalism, and rewards for participation. The IUD
is not necessarily the best form of contraception for every woman, as it may
have side effects, and requires follow-up care.113 However, the government
defended the policies, indicating that a smaller population will benefit all in
the long run.114
E. Sub-Saharan Africa
While Asian fertility is falling—sometimes even without the full
economic development called for by the demographic transition theory—
Sub-Saharan African countries with similar population profiles have growth
rates that remain high.115 The reasons are not clear, but some believe that
social and cultural patterns, well-established through history, may have an

109. Id. at 75.
110. See id. at 76–77 (“The Indonesian program pushes the so-called more effective
contraceptives.”).
111. E.g., id. at 77 (“An article . . . revealed in 1984 how in one district in East Java, villagers
complained that they were being penalized for using traditional methods rather than modern
contraceptives distributed by the government.”).
112. Id. at 77–79.
113. See id. at 77 (“At the same time that the official family[-]planning program pushes the pill
and IUD, adequate health infrastructure does not exist for the treatment of side effects, routine checks
of women with IUDs, or long-term monitoring of hormonal contraceptive users through cervical
smear tests for cancer, etc.”); see also Boland, supra note 26, at 1147–48 (providing information on
various reproductive technologies and IUDs).
114. See HARTMANN, supra note 90, at 82 (“Defenders of the Indonesian program like to point
out that even though community pressure is instrumental in getting individuals to practice
contraception in Indonesia, in the long run those individuals benefit, through the improvements
family[-]planning brings to their health and lives.”).
115. See John C. Caldwell & Pat Caldwell, High Fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa, SCI. AM., May 1990,
at 118, 118 (“No independent nation of sub-Saharan Africa has shown definitive evidence of fertility
decline, and in many nations population growth is accelerating.”).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019

19

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 3, Art. 5

936

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:917

impact.116 Historically, the African world view is based on eternal
lineage.117 Ancestry and descent are key, and are reflected in notions of
spirituality, as well as virtue (e.g., many children are a reward for virtue) and
sin (e.g., a barren woman is being punished). Ancestor worship is a limited
form of immortality for the father, and, in fact, the failure of descendants to
perform certain rites is believed to doom a father’s spirit to death in the
afterworld.118
Socially, marriage is not particularly important, at least not in the
traditional sense. Polygamy is common, and the concern with legitimacy is
not the same as it is in the Western World.119 Women bear and raise
children, and do most of the manual work, which is agricultural in nature.
Because of this, Africans believe that large families are better, and in fact do
better economically.120 In addition, women who are married have children
who belong to the husband’s lineage, so the husband’s family may decide
when and how many children the women will have.121 There is little
incentive for men to elect to reduce the number of children produced by
their wives because men provide little financial support to the children, and
will receive financial and other lifetime support from them, as well as the
ancestor worship, after death.122 Families often are not Western-style
nuclear families, but rather extended families living in groups, with children
raised by aunts and uncles.123 Families often have communal land tenure,
or clan ownership, so a larger clan makes for a more powerful family.124

116. See id. (“We believe the primary cause of high fertility in sub-Saharan Africa is the social
and family patterns that have developed over millennia in response to conditions in the region.”).
117. See id. at 119 (“The core of African society is its emphasis on ancestry and descent. . . . In
social terms, the emphasis is reflected in the strength of ties based on the family of descent—the
lineage.”).
118. See id. at 119–20 (“If a son does not properly organize the burial rites and the pouring of
libations during the ceremony as nourishment for the ancestors, then the father’s spirit does not
survive.”).
119. See id. at 120 (“Typically from [twenty] to [fifty] percent of wives are in polygynous
marriages, and most must be prepared for the likelihood that their husbands will acquire extra wives.”).
120. See id. (“Women are important in the African social system not only because they bear
children but also because they do most of the agricultural work.”).
121. See id. (“In the patrilineal societies that predominate, this transfer of ownership ensures
that children belong to the husband’s lineage.”).
122. See id. (recognizing “[h]usbands have little reason to restrict fertility”).
123. See id. (noting “researchers have found up to half of all dependent children living with
persons other than their own biological parents”).
124. See id. (“The communal land tenure of the lineage social structure rewards large families.”).
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Economically, the soil of Africa is not suited to mass agriculture, so the
Western notions of land ownership and material wealth accumulation did
not rise to the same level of importance in Africa.125 Western religions
have not permeated African culture, so the older forms of ancestor worship
and care still exist.126 Health care may not be available, or is insufficient,
and infant mortality is very high. The AIDS pandemic has been particularly
destructive to African populations.127 Women may be worried about dying
without children to carry on the lineage and may have as many children as
possible to reduce the risk of dying without children to carry on the family
line.128
More recently, urbanization is occurring throughout the entire continent,
along with individual rather than communal land ownership.129 Health care
is probably the key to a long-term reduction in the population growth rate
in Africa—reducing infertility, saving lives of children, and introducing
meaningful family-planning into the mix.130
F. Western Europe and Japan
Western Europe and Japan have the lowest birth rates in the world—well
below replacement rates.131 This has led to concern about workers, as well
as old age security.132 The most common pro-natal incentives are family
allowances or payments made to families with children. Systems vary, but
125. See id. (discussing communal land tenure, stating: “[W]here there is no ownership of land
or expensive farming equipment, the only possible investment in farming is in human beings”).
126. See id. at 123 (describing how “the popular religions of Eurasia” did not overtake the
African social structure).
127. See Jones, supra note 54, at 190 (“Worldwide, the region most affected by AIDS is subSaharan Africa, where AIDS is the leading cause of death and has killed more than 19.4 million
people.”).
128. See, e.g., Bunmi Makinwa, The 1993 National Conference on Sustainable Solutions—Population,
Consumption and Culture, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 291, 293 (1994) (“If one sees only a slight
possibility of one out of five children surviving, then chances are that one will opt to have many
children to ensure that at least a few of them survive to become adults.”).
129. See Caldwell & Caldwell, supra note 115, at 123 (“Meanwhile the rural conditions that gave
rise to the lineage system are disappearing. The proportion of people living in the countryside is
declining, and individual land ownership is becoming more common.”).
130. See id. at 125 (“If reduced mortality is in fact the key to lower fertility, then the best
investment for population stability is in health services and family[-]planning together.”).
131. See Dau-Schmidt & Brun, supra note 41, at 181–84 (evaluating decreasing birth rates at a
global scale).
132. See generally Sarah Harper, Youth—A Scarce Commodity Within an Ageing World, 21 NOTRE
DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 479 (2007) (addressing the societal implications of low birth and
fertility rates).
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governments usually make payments to parents for each child between birth
and the ages of fourteen to eighteen. Prenatal allowances and grants are also
used, as are birth payments.133 Sometimes benefits regarding work or
housing are granted to those who have children.134 Extended maternity
and paternity leaves (with job security) are widely available and public day
care is available for preschool-age children.135
G. United States
The United States arguably is neither pro nor anti population growth in
its policies.136 The federal income tax arguably facilitates larger families,
but it is only at the margins that this is helpful.137 For example, deductions
for dependents; head of household status tax rates; earned income and
dependent credits; home ownership deductions; deductions for child care;
shifting income and wealth to children via the Uniform Transfers to Minors
Act or the Estate and Gift Tax; and public education aid to families with
dependent children (and other forms of public assistance) paid with general
tax funds—all tend to support larger families.138 On the other hand, the
United States has not used economic incentives or disincentives, such as

133. See DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, MEASURES, POLICIES AND
PROGRAMMES AFFECTING FERTILITY, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO NATIONAL FAMILY
PLANNING PROGRAMMES 17–33 (1972) (discussing various family allowance schemes), reprinted in
POPULATION LAW AND POLICY 326, 326–28 (Stephen L. Isaacs ed., 1981).
134. See id. at 328 (“In most countries some system exists whereby persons subject to income
taxation are granted a reduction in the size of their tax payments if they have family responsibilities.”).
135. See STEPHEN L. ISAACS, Incentives to Increase Population Growth: Introductory Note (“Making
motherhood more attractive by providing extended maternity leave or providing day care for young
children are other kinds of nonmonetary incentives.”), in POPULATION LAW AND POLICY 325–26
(Stephen L. Isaacs ed., 1981).
136. See Babor, supra note 7, at 90 (“The United States adopted the position that population
growth was a ‘neutral phenomenon,’ neither harmful nor beneficial to the environment, and that the
solution should be ‘market-based.’”). Compare Ira B. Shepard, Federal Taxation and Population Control,
55 N.C. L. REV. 385, 388 (1977) (“Present federal tax laws encourage population growth by providing
subsidies to families with children.”), with Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YALE HUM.
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 22 (2007) (“To the extent that tradition [of regulating procreative choice] reflects
what is and is not a fundamental right, U.S. history does not support the notion of a broad procreative
right.”), and ISSACS, supra note 135, at 325 (“Most countries have enacted legislation to protect and
strengthen the family. In fact, the United States is the only developed country without a general family
allowance plan.”).
137. See Shepard, supra note 136, at 388 (explaining U.S. tax law “is a product of a series of
decisions, discretely made, each of which has had as an unstated premise the desirability (or at least
acceptance) of high birthrates”).
138. See id. at 388–92 (describing various favorable tax treatments).
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those found in European countries, to affect population growth.139 In
general, many forms of birth control are easily available in the United States,
along with education about the options.140 Abortion is also widely
available.141
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AND POPULATION
A. A Brief Summary of the Basics
Human rights, as a concept, has existed for centuries. The Magna Carta
in England, the Code of Hammurabi, writings of early scholars and
philosophers (Aristotle, Aquinas, Grotius, Mencius) worldwide, as well as
the Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man all contain human rights ideology.142 Certain
institutions or activities (slavery for example) were understood to be
violations of international law.143 However, modern human rights law
came into existence after World War II, with destruction and devastation
fresh in the minds of the Western World leadership.144
139. See ISSACS, supra note 135, at 325 (recognizing the United States does not offer family
allowances).
140. See HARTMANN, supra note 90, at 240 (“Today sterilization is the most widely used method
of birth control in the United States . . . .”); 2018 WORLD POPULATION DATA SHEET, supra note 2,
at 10 (showing 73% of married women between the ages of fifteen and forty-nine reported using “all
methods” of contraception, while 63% reported using “modern methods” of contraception); cf. Lance
Gable, Reproductive Health as a Human Right, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 957, 964–65 (2010) (“Only one
in five married women in Africa use modern contraception, and the proportion drops to less than one
in twenty women in some areas of the continent.”).
141. Cf. Gable, supra note 140, at 965–66 (“Access to abortion services varies significantly in
different countries, ranging from complete prohibition of the practice to pregnancy termination on
demand.”).
142. See Burns H. Weston, Human Rights: Concept and Content, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
ONLINE (2013) (providing a historical account of the development of human rights), reprinted in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 7, 7–16 (Burns H. Weston & Anna Grear eds., 4th ed.
2016).
143. See, e.g., Tom J. Farer, The United Nations and Human Rights: More Than a Whimper Less Than
a Roar, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 550, 553–55 (1987) (describing examples of countries, actions, and policies that
violated international law).
144. See Eric Engle, Universal Human Rights: A Generational History, 12 ANN. SURV. INT’L &
COMP. L. 219, 220 (2006) (“As a result of the horrors of the Second World War . . . individuals and
organi[z]ations were tried for crimes under international law: crimes against peace, crimes against
humanity and war crimes at the Nuremberg Trials.”); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection
of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1982) (“After the Second World
War . . . a broader system of protection for human rights was established, with the expectation that it
would be applied to all human beings, in large and small countries alike.”).
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The United Nations was formed, and shortly thereafter the United
Nations Charter145 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights146
were adopted.147 Both refer to human rights, with the Declaration serving
as a detailed definition and interpretation of human rights listed in the
Charter.148 Thereafter, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
developed two covenants for adoption by member states: the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)149 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).150 Both
were promulgated in 1966 and entered into force in 1976.151 Over time,
scholars came to think of human rights in progressive categories, or
generations, roughly corresponding to schools of thought.
1.

First Generation Rights

At their earliest inception, “First Generation” rights “were essentially
claims of the individual against state interference and to selfgovernment.”152 These rights are exemplified by the ICCPR.153 The
Covenant is focused on the rights of the individual, which it phrases as
“negative rights”—freedom from, rather than freedom to.154 The core
values of the first generation are the protection of the individual from
government interference or overreaching and the idea of government
The emphasis is on the
abstention rather than intervention.155
maximum fulfillment of individual self-interest and the existence of a
social contract, with the individual giving up some rights, but preserving

145. See U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶¶ 1–4 (setting forth the purposes of the United Nations).
146. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
147. See Farer, supra note 143, at 553–55 (recalling the creation of the United Nations).
148. Id. at 555–58 (detailing the contents of the Charter and the Declaration).
149. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
150. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3.
151. Farer, supra note 143, at 558 nn.39–40.
152. Engle, supra note 144, at 256. “The first wave of human rights in modernity is usually
identified with the period of Scottish enlightenment and the age of reason (the nineteenth century),
expressed in the liberal revolutions in America, France, and Latin America.” Id.
153. See Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, Comment on the ICESCR and the Character of the Rights
(commenting on the differences between the two major UN Covenants), in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 245, 246–48 (2d ed. 2000).
154. See Engle, supra note 144, at 257 (“First-generation rights can be summary[z]ed, roughly,
as negative civil and political rights—‘freedoms from’ rather than ‘rights to.’”); Farer, supra note 143,
at 558–60 (elaborating on the language contained in the Covenant).
155. Engle, supra note 144, at 256.
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others.156 The rights are numerous and include: prohibition of slavery;
prohibition of torture; right to a fair and public trial; right to participate in
government; freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; freedom of
opinion and expression; and property rights.157 The notions are Western
notions of “rights” and come from ideals of the United States and Europe
after World War II in terms of capitalism and democracy. These rights are
perhaps the most accepted worldwide and often have a privileged place in a
rights “hierarchy.”158
2.

Second Generation Rights

The so-called second generation of human rights has roots in the socialist
tradition of parts of Europe.159 The rights are more positive than negative,
guaranteeing individuals rights that require, rather than limit, government
action.160 The rights are exemplified by the ICESCR.161 Examples include
the right to work, rest, and leisure; the right to education; the right to a
standard of living needed for health and well-being; and a right to social
security.162 The rights are focused more on the safety and security of the
individual, rather than the independence and autonomy of the individual.163
3.

Third Generation Rights

The third generation of human rights is derived from the Third (or
developing) World.164 “Essentially, third-generation rights call for the
156. See Weston, supra note 142, at 12 (“What is constant in this first-generation conception is
the notion of liberty, a shield that safeguards the individual—alone and in association with others—
against the abuse of political authority.”).
157. Id.
158. See id. (“Also included are the right to own property and the right not to be deprived of it
arbitrarily—rights that were fundamental to the interests fought for in the American and French
revolutions and to the rise of capitalism.”).
159. Id.
160. See id. (“Historically, economic, social, and cultural rights are a counterpoint to the first
generation, civil and political rights, and are conceived more in positive terms (‘rights to’) than in
negative ones (‘freedoms from’) . . . .”).
161. See Steiner & Alston, supra note 153, at 246 (“[T]he ICESCR usually employs the formula
‘States Parties recognize the right of everyone to . . . .’”).
162. See id. (listing examples of the rights found within Part III of the ICESR).
163. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 163, 163 (Burns H. Weston & Anna
Grear eds., 4th ed. 2016) (“In this chapter, we turn to a set of values—basic human needs as security
rights—that concern the right of individuals and groups to expect that governments will do something
positive to support their fundamental needs . . . .”).
164. See Weston, supra note 142, at 13 (noting “[t]hree of the claimed rights reflect the
emergence of nationalism in the developing world in the 1960s and ‘70s”); see generally Christof Heyns,
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redistribution of power and resources, and consider the current
international system ineffective in its attempts to resolve contemporary
issues.”165 The rights are group rights rather than individual rights.166
Personhood may be seen through the lens of group identity in this category
of rights.167 Historically, these nations have the challenges of economic
underdevelopment and the desire for modernization and industrialization in
common.168 These are not part of the United Nations treaty structure, with
the exception of discrimination, but are part of the African Charter on
Human and People’s Rights.169 Such rights are more aspirational than
actual, and include: rights to economic and social development,170
self-determination, peoples’ preservation of cultural traditions,171 a healthy
The African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 679 (2004)
(describing the ongoing “struggle for human rights on the African continent”).
165. DOUGLAS ROCHE, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO PEACE 122–44 (2003), reprinted in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 255, 259 (Burns H. Weston & Anna Grear eds., 4th ed. 2016).
“Third-generation rights include the right to political, economic, and cultural self-determination; the
right to economic and social development; the right to participate in and benefit from the common
heritage of mankind; the right to a healthy environment; the right to humanitarian relief, and the right
to peace.” Id. at 259–60.
166. See Weston, supra note 142, at 13 (“Finally, the third generation, composed of solidarity or
group rights, while drawing upon and reconceptualizing the demands associated with the first two
generations of rights, is best understood as a product of both the rise and the decline of the state since
the mid-twentieth century.”).
167. See id. (“[E]ach of them also manifests an individual dimension. For example, while it may
be said to be the collective right of all countries and peoples . . . so also may it be said to be the
individual right of every person to benefit from a developmental policy that is based on the satisfaction
of material and nonmaterial human needs.”).
168. See Arjun Sengupta, On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development, 24 HUM. RTS. Q.
837, 866–67 (2002) (contrasting how “resource constraints affect different countries differently” in the
context of the right to development).
169. See Heyns, supra note 164, at 690 (noting “[t]he inclusion of socio-economic rights in the
Charter is significant”).
170. See Isabella D. Bunn, The Right to Development: Implications for International Economic Law,
15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1425, 1429 (2000) (“The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights urges
all nations to respect specified rights and freedoms. While several of these rights are in the civil and
political realm, a number expressly pertain to economic concerns.”); Sengupta, supra note 168, at 840
(“The right to development unifies civil and political rights with economic, social and cultural rights
into an indivisible and interdependent set of human rights and fundamental freedoms, to be enjoyed
by all human beings . . . .”); Martin V. Totaro, Legal Positivism, Constructivism, and International Human
Rights Law: The Case of Participatory Development, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 719, 737 (2008) (“The fundamental
problem with according the right to participatory development status as a customary international law,
however, is that there are too many unknowns with respect to what constitutes this purported right.”).
171. See Ron Merkel, The Right to Difference, 3 N.Y.C. L. REV. 81, 81 (1998) (“One of the most
fundamental and least analyzed of all human rights is the right of individuals to their cultural identity—
the right to be different.”); Shana Tabak, Aspiring States, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 499, 522 (2016) (“[T]he right
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environment,172 and a right to benefit from shared resources of mankind
(including technology). For example, the right to a clean and healthy
environment transcends national borders and includes: access to
information, participation in decision-making, and the ability to pursue
remedies.173 The right to development might be defined as the right to a
constant improvement in the condition and well-being of an entire
population and of all individuals within it, based on participation in decisionmaking and fair distribution of benefits.174 The right to self-determination
is particularly challenging, since it applies to peoples, not minorities, and
guarantees the right of every “people” to its own state, but does not include
a right of secession.175 These rights are different than the other generations
of rights because they tend to raise worldwide equity issues in terms of the
“right” to pollute or to industrialize or to urbanize the society.176 The
Western World is already at a fairly high level of development, but may
interfere with so-called Third World rights to development.
Finally, the survival rights of indigenous peoples are probably in this
category as well, linked to the preservation of certain parts of the
environment and to their unique cultural traditions. Some remote tribes are

to self-determination entitles all self-defined groups or peoples with a coherent identity and a
connection to a defined territory to collectively determine their political future in a democratic fashion,
and to be free from persecution and discrimination.”); see also Hurst Hannum, The Right of SelfDetermination in the Twenty-First Century, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 773, 773–80 (1998) (describing the
evolution of “self-determination” as a right).
172. Luis E. Rodriguez-Rivera, Is the Human Right to Environment Recognized Under International
Law? It Depends on the Source, 12 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 11–12 (2001) (discussing the
“[s]everal attempts [that] have been made to provide substantive content to the right to environment”);
Jennifer A. Downs, Note, A Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environment: An Argument for a Third
Generation Right, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 351, 352 (1993) (proposing “recognition of a new human
right to a clean and ecologically balanced environment as a ‘third generation’ human right, necessary
to facilitate fulfillment of the first and second generations of human rights which already guarantee
basic rights and freedoms to all people”).
173. See Downs, supra note 172, at 362 (“[T]he right to a healthy environment is vital to the
fulfillment of first and second generation rights; persons must have a viable, decent environment in
which to live in order to provide and ensure sustenance, health, economic security, and other minimum
living standards.”).
174. See Sengupta, supra note 168, at 841–46 (evaluating “whether the right to development can
be regarded as a human right”).
175. See Hannum, supra note 171, at 776–79 (recognizing the right to self-determination does
not include a right to secession).
176. See Sengupta, supra note 168, at 848 (“The nature of this process of development is
centered around the concept of equity and justice . . . leading to the improvement of the well-being of
the entire population.”).
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threatened by destruction of native habitats and assimilation of the group
into a larger society.177
4.

Fourth Generation Rights

The fourth generation of human rights is not an actual set of rights at this
time, but some argue that they should be both recognized and protected.178
This group of rights is designed to protect the future peoples of the world,
rather than current populations and individuals.179 Some parts of the right
to a healthy environment180 or a right to peace,181 for example, are
presented in terms of benefit to future generations, rather than the existing
one.182 In addition, some arguments are made for “technical rights” for
177. See CHRISTIAN BAY, HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE PERIPHERY: NO ROOM IN THE ARK FOR
YANOMAMI? 23–41 (1984) (“Eventually, I believe, most of the now isolated or semi-isolated
indigenous peoples will choose to integrate in some ways and to a degree with the larger society.”),
reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 124, 128 (Richard Pierre Claude & Burns H.
Weston eds., 2d ed. 1992); Ingrid Washinawatok, International Emergence: Twenty-One Years at the United
Nations, 3 N.Y.C. L. REV. 41, 57 (1998) (“Indigenous lands continue to disappear as the demands for
resources—oil, coal, and forests, for example—overwhelm the rights of the nearly powerless local
populations inhabiting the targeted areas.”); William Andrew Shutkin, Note, International Human Rights
Law and the Earth: The Protection of Indigenous Peoples and the Environment, 31 VA. J. INT’L L. 479, 509 (1991)
(“[I]nternational law in its present state can and should be expanded to protect the rights of indigenous
peoples and the environment.”).
178. See, e.g., Weston, supra note 142, at 14 (“Similarly reflecting the continuing pressure for
human rights evolution is a current suggestion that there exists a ‘fourth generation’ of human rights
consisting of women’s and intergenerational rights (the rights of future generations, including existing
children) among others.”).
179. See, e.g., Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment,
84 AM. J. INT’L L. 198, 199 (1990) (“As members of the present generation, we hold the [E]arth in
trust for future generations. At the same time, we are beneficiaries entitled to use and benefit from
it.”).
180. See generally Downs, supra note 172 (arguing for the right to a healthy and ecologically
balanced environment).
181. See generally ROCHE, supra note 165, at 255–62 (emphasizing the importance of “the human
right to peace”); Cecilia M. Bailliet, Untraditional Approaches to Law: Teaching the International Law of Peace,
12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1 (2014) (evaluating difference foundations and developments of the
recognition of a right to peace); John H.E. Fried, The United Nations’ Effort to Establish a Right of the
Peoples to Peace, 2 PACE Y.B. INT’L L. 21 (1990) (discussing the development of the United Nations
recognizing a right to peace).
182. See Paul A. Barresi, Beyond Fairness to Future Generations: An Intragenerational Alternative to
Intergenerational Equity in the International Environmental Arena, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 59, 77–79 (1997)
(“The members of future generations would stand as intended third party beneficiaries to the
contract.”); Weiss, supra note 179, at 200 (“In practice, some generations may improve the
environment, with the result that later generations will inherit a richer and more diverse natural
resource base. In this case, they would be treated better than previous generations.”). But see Jeffrey
M. Gaba, Environmental Ethics and Our Moral Relationship to Future Generations: Future Rights and Present
THE
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persons: a right to communication and to technology in the modern
world.183 These would not necessarily apply to future generations.
5.

Women’s Rights

Women’s rights are in an interesting position in the rights hierarchy,
since freedom from discrimination on bases other than gender is a key part
of the first generation of human rights.184 Women’s rights came to the
table later, with the adoption of CEDAW in 1979.185 CEDAW defines
“discrimination against women” as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction
made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or
nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of
their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms . . . .”186 CEDAW addressed human
trafficking; suffrage for women; economic, legal, and educational equality;
and equality of opportunity.187 This is linked, of course, to decisions
regarding reproduction, as well as to decisions about when and whom to
marry, and rights to divorce.188
The rights of women are fundamentally affected in certain cultures when

Virtue, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 249, 258 (1999) (“Since many would conclude that we have no moral
obligation to procreate to ensure the existence of future generations, it is also possible to conclude that
we have no moral duty to contingent humans who may, or may not, come into existence.”).
183. See Sohn, supra note 144, at 60 (exploring additional rights, stating “[s]ome of these rights
are perhaps only a variation of other such rights as the right to an adequate standard of living, to
freedom of information, or to peace” and concluding “others present intriguing new problems”).
184. See generally Weston, supra note 142, at 11–12 (discussing the “three ‘generations’ of human
rights advanced by the French jurist Karel Vasak”).
185. CEDAW, supra note 52. The United States has not ratified any portion of CEDAW;
however, “[I]t has made great strides in the fight against women’s human rights abuses.” Rebecca L.
Hillock, Comment, Establishing the Rights of Women Globally: Has the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women Made a Difference?, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L.
481, 488 (2005).
186. CEDAW, supra note 52, at 16.
187. Id. at 16–20.
188. See Gable, supra note 140, at 979 (“The CEDAW’s description of the right to health
provides a much more specific description of the content of the right to health in the context of
reproductive rights and clearly imposes specific obligations on the state consistent with this right.”);
Margaret Plattner, The Status of Women Under International Human Rights Law and the 1995 UN World
Conference on Women, Beijing, China, 84 KY. L.J. 1249, 1255 (1995) (“CEDAW, adopted in 1979 by the
[United Nations] General Assembly, requires those nation-states agreeing to implement it to take
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in government, law, education,
employment, health care, business, reproductivity, and family life.”).
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population restrictions are attempted,189 with resulting sex ratio imbalances
in countries such as China, India, and South Korea.190 A normal ratio for
boys to girls at birth is 105–107 to 100, since more boys than girls die in
childhood.191 But in China, for example, the ratio might vary from 117–
124 boys to 100 girls.192 This is the result of selective abortion by parents
when sonogram or other prenatal screening is available, as well as female
infanticide, female abandonment, or simply hiding girl children from
government officials, all as a result of cultural preferences for male
children.193
6.

Customary Law

Some human rights principles rise to the level of jus cogens, or customary
law.194 These are human rights that have been recognized for many years
by the international community and are agreed upon and respected by
civilized nations.195 The custom is recognized by treaty, international
agreements, and domestic laws. Enforcement is binding upon all states in
the international community.196 Examples normally would include a right
to life, prohibition of slavery and torture, equality before the law, and
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.197 These are not necessarily
universal beliefs, but are part of the structure of the rules, treaties, and
decisions in international human rights. For purposes of this article, it is
189. See Sarah R. Hamilton, The Status of Women in Chile: Violations of Human Rights and Recourse
Under International Law, 25 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 111, 123 (2004) (“The results—high maternal
mortality, uncontrolled population growth, widespread poverty, and impeded entry of women into the
cultural, social, and economic life of the country—have been uniformly detrimental to women and to
the exercise of human rights in Chile more generally.”).
190. See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 43, at 1–5 (noting countries facing a sex ratio imbalance).
191. Id. at 4.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 7 (identifying “the major ways in which females might statistically disappear”).
194. See Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291, 291–92
(2006) (evaluating jus cogens in the “debate over hierarchy of norms and sources in international law”).
195. Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L.
331, 332 (2009) (“As some scholars have celebrated and others have lamented, the concept of jus
cogens has been widely perceived to establish a normative hierarchy within international law, endowing
certain fundamental norms such as the prohibitions against slavery and genocide with a quasiconstitutional status vis-à-vis ordinary conventional and customary norms.”).
196. The U.S. Supreme Court discusses the law of custom in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677
(1900). See also Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 195, at 331 (“In international law, the term ‘jus
cogens’ (literally, ‘compelling law’) refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding
conflicting treaties and custom.”).
197. Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 195, at 331–32.
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possible that the right to education about and access to birth control might
be part of the modern customary law. Customary law is not limited to
human rights law and may extend to business or economic international
principles.198 Customary law may only be abrogated or derogated in cases
of emergency—where officially proclaimed—and then only to the extent
strictly necessary.199
B. Critiques of Human Rights
I mentioned earlier that the informally accepted hierarchy of human
rights is subject to debate. In my class, I usually ask the students to take a
look at some critiques of human rights, challenging the lens through which
we view the world. For example, a Hindu author challenges the whole
notion of human rights as a Western concept, assuming a universal human
nature, the dignity of the individual (vs. society as a whole), and a democratic
order.200 Communitarianism also challenges the idea that individual rights
are superior to those of a society and notes that human rights law tend to
focus on rights, rather than duties.201 Critical Legal Studies author Mark
Tushnet offers a critique arguing that human rights are merely political
constructs in that they are indeterminate, unstable, falsely convert the
abstract into reality, and impede real progress.202
This is particularly true in the area of population, where religious, cultural,
historical, and traditional beliefs may affect the perceived morality of efforts
to affect population trends.203
198. See id. at 337 (recognizing the “extended debate” over various theories of jus cogens and
noting the lack of a general criterion).
199. See id. at 364 (“Those same provisions that entitle states to declare states of emergency,
however, prohibit states from derogating from norms of a jus cogens character, such as the
prohibitions on arbitrary killing, slavery, and torture.”).
200. See generally R. Panikkar, Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?, 30 DIOGENES,
no. 120, Dec. 1, 1982, at 75 (addressing whether human rights are universal).
201. See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, Communitarianism (“Communitarianism is a social philosophy that,
in contrast to theories that emphasize the centrality of the individual, emphasizes the importance of
society in articulating the good.”), in ENCYCLOPEDIA POLITICAL THOUGHT 1, 1–4 (Michael T.
Gibbons ed., 2015).
202. Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363–65, 1370–75 (1984); see also
Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 401, 404–17 (1987) (providing a critique of the Critical Legal Studies view through the lens of
race).
203. See ADAM KUPER, CULTURE: THE ANTHROPOLOGISTS’ ACCOUNT 2 (1999) (“Unlike
scientific knowledge, the wisdom of culture is subjective. Its most profound insights are relative, not
universal laws.”), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 376, 377 (Henry J. Steiner
& Philip Alston eds., 2d ed. 2000); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-
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C. Vulnerable Groups
Several subgroups are particularly affected by population law and policy.
First, native aboriginal peoples may be disrupted, as discussed above.204
Second, refugees and migrants often drastically affect population
patterns.205 For example, refugees from the Middle East and Eastern
Europe moving to Western Europe are changing political and social
dynamics, but because of higher birth rates, those immigrants may affect
cultural, religious, and other traditions in more fundamental ways in the
future.206 A third group is the elderly. As mentioned earlier, as population
growth slows, the population ages.207 An older population may have
special needs in terms of health, economic and social safety nets,
preservation of dignity, quality of life, and participation in society.208 A
population policy that results in decreasing the young population must also
focus on the gaps in providing for the needs of the elderly that are a likely
congruence.209 Finally, in a world where men greatly outnumber—and

Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives: A Preliminary Inquiry, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 15 (1990)
(arguing “human rights violations reflect the lack or weakness of cultural legitimacy of international
standards in a society”); Andrew K. Woods, A Behavioral Approach to Human Rights, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J.
51, 53 (2010) (“Human rights scholars and practitioners intuitively understand that context matters,
but their models rarely take sufficient account of situations of social influence.”). See generally Dillard,
supra note 136, for a view that argues a limitation on the procreative right.
204. See Shutkin, supra note 177, at 489 (“More fundamentally, claims relating to culture entail
the right to exist: cultural survival.”); see also discussion supra Section IV.A.3.
205. See Ved P. Nanda, International Migration: Trends, Challenges, and the Need for Cooperation Within
an International Rights Framework, 17 INT’L L. STUDENTS ASS’N J. INT’L & COMP. L. 355, 356–58 (2011)
(noting the increase in migrants worldwide); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Undocumented Migrants and the Failures
of Universal Individualism, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 699, 716 (2014) (recognizing “complexities serve
as a reminder that immigration status is not stable and that noncitizens may shift back and forth
between lawful and unlawful status over time”).
206. See, e.g., Guy de Lusignan, Global Migration and European Integration, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 179, 187–88 (1994) (“The racist movements and violence in [W]estern Europe against
immigrants and refugees, such as in Germany in 1993 against Turks and Vietnamese, are more than an
anticipation of what could happen on a wider scale in the course of the next century should nations
fall back into renewed nationalistic violence as a result of political shifts, such as those of the latest
elections in Italy or Russia.”).
207. See Lawrence O. Gostin & Anna Garsia, Governing for Health as the World Grows Older: Healthy
Lifespans in Aging Societies, 22 ELDER L.J. 111, 113 (2014) (“Across the globe, declining fertility rates,
lower infant mortality, and great longevity drive population aging: people live longer because of
improved nutrition, sanitation, health care, education and economic wellbeing.”).
208. Marcos Acle Mautone, Aging in the 21st Century: Human Rights, Economic Development, and the
World’s Growing Older Population, 35 BIFOCAL, no. 3, 2014, at 63, 64.
209. See Gostin & Garsia, supra note 207, at 115 (arguing “[t]he goal of healthy aging is
unmistakable, and benefits everyone equally in society”); Mautone, supra note 208, at 67 (“[A]s a human
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have power over—women in many societies, it is particularly important to
offer protections to children and women who are vulnerable and might be
subject to coercion or sex trafficking.210
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In the course, I eventually came to see the issues in terms of what I called
the four Es: Environment, Economics, Equality, and Equity. All are
important, but at times, may be in conflict when viewed in light of a
particular philosophy or policy. I also see the progression of analysis
concerning world population growth in terms of these four foci. In modern
times, we started with the idea of preventing harm to the environment and
attempted to argue for stabilization or even reduction in population size in
order to preserve human quality of life. In contrast, the economists argued
that a stagnant population would harm the human quality of life in different
ways: economic destabilization, lack of creativity and innovation, aging
populations, lack of workers, and disproportionate burden on younger
persons to care for the elderly. Later, the ideas moved to emphasize the
equality of women in terms of education and access to contraception. The
belief was that if women knew more about health, nutrition, hygiene, and
sanitation—with access to birth control—then birth rates would go down.
Finally, the later discussions focus on equity—between developed and
developing parts of the world, between those with less power (as individuals
and as a collective) and those with more.
With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the wars, famines, and
epidemics predicted by the alarmists have not come to pass. The world

rights issue, population aging implies that the need to respect, protect, and promote the rights of older
people increases as this group grows in relation to others.”).
210. See Aliya Haider, Adolescents Under International Law: Autonomy as the Key to Reproductive Health,
14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 605, 619 (2008) (“Many adolescents face violence and coercion within
their families and communities—abuses that make it impossible to exercise their basic rights to
informed decision-making.”); Kathleen A. McKee & Lynne Marie Kohm, Examining the Associations
Between Sustainable Development Population Policies and Human Trafficking, 23 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 1, 7
(2014) (suggesting “the best answer to global population concerns, demographic demise, and human
trafficking is family strengthening and stability that values women and children”); Amanda Misasi, The
Sexual and Reproductive Rights of Adolescents: The Implementation and Expansion of the Reproductive Rights of
Adolescents Through the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 23 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 221, 224
(2017) (“Underpinning sexual and reproductive rights are basic guarantees of life, health, equality, and
non-discrimination.”). But see Oliver Phillips, Comment, A Brief Introduction to the Relationship Between
Sexuality and Rights, 33 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 451, 458 (2005) (“However, many sexual rights are not
so unambiguously presented as universally applicable.”).
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population growth rate is reduced, but still increasing overall.211
Government efforts to coerce compliance with growth policies through
direct interference with biological reproductive functions, including denial
of access to birth control, clearly violate international principles of human
rights law, and are often unsuccessful. It seems to me that the protection
of the individual right to reproductive choice is critical and must be
preserved. Milder forms of coercion, such as propaganda, tax breaks or
subsidies, or other financial incentives or disincentives probably do not
violate human rights and may have some impact. The larger issue is one of
culture and belief. The peoples of many cultures will not be swayed in the
near future by such actions. New, original ideas and solutions are needed.
This takes me back to the economists, although I never saw myself in that
camp.
The problem with the sustainability approach, with its focus on the
environment, is that it can be argued that if we want to preserve the right to
a clean environment or a right to a certain level of Earth quality, then we are
arguing for the rights of future generations—rights of those who are not
here yet. In addition, controlling pollution emissions, deforestation, toxic
wastes, food sources and processing, manufacturing, building, etc. is entirely
different than interfering with the decisions of the individual in terms of
reproduction. Existing persons have a fundamental human right to make
their own reproductive choices. We use force or strong coercion in
violation of human rights at our peril and endanger future generations as
well. If we believe in human rights as both international law and norm, then
we need to look to the most valuable assets—the human mind and creative
spirit—to further the goals of sustainability.

211. See Babor, supra note 7, at 87 (“Although the total fertility rate, that is, the average number
of children a women will give birth to, assuming current birth rates remain constant throughout her
lifetime, has dropped from a worldwide average of 5.3 children in 1950 to 2.96 children in 1997, the
number of people born each year has doubled both because infant mortality has declined and because
the base for those entering their reproductive years has expanded.”).
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